COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MODELS FOR THE USE OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES IN SPECIAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND UKRAINE

Abstract

The article argues that the digitalization of hybrid threats transforms special information operations (SIO) from episodic psychological influence campaigns into continuous sociotechnical governance, where the primary target is the cognitive domain (will, understanding, motivation, and behaviour of target audiences). The study aims to compare four national models of digital technology use in SIO - an institutionalized-normative model (United States), a centralized-party model (People’s Republic of China), a hybrid-destructive model (Russian Federation), and an adaptive-network model (Ukraine) - and to outline institutional development priorities for the Ukrainian model with a focus on measurable cognitive effects. The methodology combines a criteria-matrix framework with structural-functional and systems analysis. The comparison covers the institutional architecture and command logic; interagency coordination and deconfliction of parallel influences; normative constraints on domestic vs. foreign audiences; the technological core and data access; the management cycle “data → analysis → planning → influence → assessment → adjustment”; approaches to effectiveness evaluation; and key vulnerabilities. The findings show that the U.S. model provides a technologically mature but legally constrained system built around accountability and precision targeting; China’s model emphasizes centralized cognitive dominance enabled by party oversight and military-civil fusion; Russia’s model relies on a proxy ecosystem designed to weaponize uncertainty, polarization, and erosion of trust; and Ukraine’s model is defined by resilience through rapid learning, integration of state capabilities with networked communities, and extensive use of commercial digital solutions. Based on the comparative results, the paper proposes a three-segment architecture for Ukraine’s digital SIO (coordination, analytic, and networked execution layers) and introduces an assessment standard structured as “objective → indicator → data sources → success criterion”, supported by a minimum metric set (trust, polarization/fragmentation, robustness of interpretations, and readiness to act). The results are practically relevant for refining interagency coordination, designing national information security policies, and embedding ethical and legal safeguards for digital influence activities.